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There are a hundred or so men, perhaps a couple of dozen women, and a lot of flags and 
banners. The marchers are flanked on all sides by more men, high-vis-clad police. Many 
sit on huge, powerful horses. The animals stomp in frustration, heads straining, breath 
clouding the air. I step back. The marchers are on the move now and chanting. ‘Muhammad 
is a paedo, Muhammad is a paedo!’ ‘Allah! Allah! Who the fuck is Allah!’ I catch sight of 
my respondent, who nods with a slight smile. Is this acknowledgement? Pride, ownership, 
display? He told me he wouldn’t want his kids at an event like this. But he looks as though 
he is having fun. Afterwards I catch up with the organizer, Ian Crossland, then national 
spokesman for the English Defence League. You’re speaking out against the sexual exploi-
tation of local girls, I say. Protesting grooming gangs. Wouldn’t your message be more 
powerful without the offensive signs, the anti-Muslim rhetoric? The thing is, he says, the 
lads are angry, their blood is up, and this is how we express ourselves.
Field research notes, English Defence League (EDL) demonstration, Telford, 5 November 
2016
What expression of masculinity is apparent here? How was I to understand this 
encounter, one moment in a wider research project to explore the function of 
gender in the contentious field of UK ‘extremism’?1 In particular, how could this 
semi-ethnographic project engage a feminist analysis to understand the EDL, an 
anti-Islam(ist) movement, composed largely of men, in which an opposition to 
western feminism is an active driver in participation? Actors involved in protest 
against Islam and Islamism are increasingly designated in both media discourse 
and UK government policy as ‘extreme’, which is to say, opposing values of 
democracy, the rule of law and diversity of faith.2 The EDL is a largely homoso-
cial movement,3 and the men involved are also increasingly framed through a 
* This article is part of a special section of the November 2019 issue of International Affairs on ‘“Well, what is 
the feminist perspective on international affairs?”: theory/practice’, guest-edited by Helen M. Kinsella and 
Laura J. Shepherd. This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number 
ES/J500057/1]. Due to ethical considerations, the wider data from which this article is drawn is not publicly 
available.
1 The wider research project also engaged with British Islamists, such as Anjem Choudhary and others 
networked to him. In this piece I focus only on one particular radical right movement, the EDL.
2 HM Government, Counter-Extremism Strategy, policy paper, 19 Oct. 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/counter-extremism-strategy.
3 Jamie Bartlett and Mark Littler, Inside the EDL (London: Demos, 2011), p. 5, https://www.demos.co.uk/files/
Inside_the_edl_WEB.pdf; Hilary Pilkington, ‘“EDL angels stand beside their men ...  not behind them”: the 
politics of gender and sexuality in an anti-Islam(ist) movement’, Gender and Education 29: 2, 2017, pp. 238–57. 
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prism of ‘toxic masculinity’. This research explores ground firmly within what 
Zalewski and Stern have termed ‘the gender industry’, in which gender scholars 
are expected to produce ‘effective knowledge’ to influence policy, in this case, to 
counter extremism.4 
My work began, therefore, with Zalewski, and her ‘“man” question’. It is the 
question Zalewski first posed some 20 years ago as an invitation to ‘question the 
unquestionable’ and ‘problematize the subjecthood of man’.5 Following feminist 
scholarship, this constituted an attempt to reposition the focus of study from female 
subjectivities, with the aim of raising the prominence of gender in International 
Relations (IR).6 It was about understanding not ‘women’, but power relations. This 
article considers the lessons Zalewski’s question offers for understanding contem-
porary extremism—in particular, gender in the radical right. It charts, however, 
not what Zalewski imagined, an interrogation of masculinities, a making visible of 
gender in all its manifestations, but what she predicted: the reinstitution of existing 
masculinisms and the essentialization of masculinity in sex.7
Through exploration of the function of gender in the EDL, this article argues 
that current understandings of extremism demonstrate a neglect of Zalewski’s 
‘man’ question in favour of questions of particular ‘masculinities’, toxic or crisis. 
Simplistic accounts of masculinities increasingly ‘fill the gaps’ in both understand-
ings of extreme groups and policy to counter them (‘countering violent extremism’ 
or CVE). This article proceeds in two parts. First, it suggests the promise of 
Zalewski’s approach as a disruption of the essentialisms of ‘toxic masculinity’, 
outlining the genealogy of the term and briefly discussing its homogenizing effects 
in countering extremism. Second, through analysis of ‘close-up’ research with 
EDL activists, I explore two possible ways to enact instead the promise of the man 
question: one is to disrupt the idea of ‘toxicity’ as distinct from patriarchy, and 
recognize EDL masculinities as belonging to a repertoire of wider social norms; 
another is to disrupt the necessary link between men’s bodies and masculinities. 
This piece reflects on Zalewski’s relevance to the field of masculinities and the 
possibilities for deconstructing extremism, in order to emphasize her prescience. 
In each problematic encounter with gender and its effects in this field, Zalewski 
has thought there before.
Extremism is a sensitive issue, and I am aware of the risk of reproducing unpal-
atable and racist discourses, even as I seek to problematize them. Parpart and 
Zalewski note of their feminist interrogation of masculinity that ‘interrupting 
this stability while at the same time invoking its terms ...  is ...  tricky’.8 I make 
(Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 7 Aug. 2019.)
4 Maria Stern and Marysia Zalewski, ‘Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of milita-
risation’, Review of International Studies 35: 3, 2009, p. 615.
5 Marysia Zalewski, ‘Introduction’, in Marysia Zalewski and Jane L. Parpart, eds, The ‘man’ question in Interna-
tional Relations (Boulder, CO: Routledge, 1997), pp. 8, 12.
6 Zalewski, ‘Introduction’; Jane L. Parpart and Marysia Zalewski, ‘Introduction: rethinking the man question’, 
in Jane L. Parpart and Marysia Zalewski, Rethinking the man question: sex, gender and violence in International Rela-
tions (London and New York: Zed, 2008).
7 Stern and Zalewski, ‘Feminist fatigue(s)’.
8 Parpart and Zalewski, ‘Introduction: rethinking the man question’, p. 2.
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no claims to have succeeded in this aim in my discussion of the radical right. 
In particular, I use the term ‘extremism’, yet criticize its application to specific 
groups. I also include transcript material representative of the politics of the 
movement researched, and therefore likely offensive to many. These transcripts 
represent views which homogenize Islam and Muslims, and fail to recognize the 
diversity of Muslim experiences. I include this difficult ethnographic material for 
two reasons. First, researchers of the far and radical right, including Blee and 
Pilkington, emphasize the need for ‘close-up’ research with these often ‘distasteful’, 
‘repugnant’ or ‘dangerous’ groups.9 This is particularly important, given that 
much work distances itself from the people involved, either through the adoption 
of pathologizing theoretical frameworks or through the use of online material, 
such as posts on social media.10 Indeed, the actions of the EDL are frequently 
collapsed into single explanatory factors, racism or toxicity. Instead I adopted an 
empathetic approach as part of an ethnographic methodology, which asserts the 
necessity of recognizing the legitimacy of the participant viewpoint, even where 
the view itself crosses the cordon sanitaire of acceptability.
Second, it is important that ethnographic research is evidenced through the 
inclusion of authentic voices from these mainly white working-class research 
participants. This inclusion is not gratuitous. The broader demographic of work-
ing-class British voices, whether they are white or people from ethnic minority 
groups,11 is infrequently represented in academic literature, and often misrepre-
sented in the mainstream.12 In the contemporary UK context, both Bailey and 
Pilkington emphasize the need to avoid a normative approach which either homog-
enizes or condemns the experiences of those who hold ‘radical’ political positions.13 
Views of those in ‘extreme’ but ‘marginalized’ groups (some might argue, self- 
marginalized) are frequently judged against a white middle-class liberalism and 
regarded as exceptional, rather than as a manifestation of wider social discourse. Too 
often they are analysed only in order to be condemned—indeed, not to condemn 
can risk academic censure.14 I do not share the views of interviewees whose words 
I reproduce here. They all knew this. But I did listen, and this piece is about them. 
There are many victims of their views. Documentation of the impacts of EDL 
9 Kathleen M. Blee, ‘Ethnographies of the far right’, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 36: 2, 2007, pp. 119–28; 
Hilary Pilkington, Loud and proud: passion and politics in the English Defence League (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2016); Johanna Esseveld and Ron Eyerman, ‘Which side are you on? Reflections on meth-
odological issues in the study of “distasteful” social movements’, in Mario Diani and Ron Eyerman, eds, 
Studying collective action (London: Sage, 1992), pp. 217–18, cited in Pilkington, Loud and proud, p. 13.
10 Pilkington, Loud and proud, p. 13.
11 See guidance on the appropriate terms from the UK Government style guide: https://guide.ethnicity-facts-
figures.service.gov.uk/a-z.
12 Bev Skeggs, ‘The making of class and gender through visualizing moral subject formation’, Sociology 39: 5, 
2005, pp. 965–82; Pilkington, Loud and proud; Owen Jones, Chavs: the demonization of the working class (London: 
Verso, 2012); Selina Todd, The people: the rise and fall of the working class, 1910–2010 (London: John Murray, 2014).
13 Gavin Bailey, ‘Extremism, community and stigma: researching the far right and radical Islam in their context’, 
in Kalwant Bhopal and Ross Deuchar, eds, Researching marginalized groups (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 
22–4; Pilkington, Loud and proud, p. 1.
14 Konrad Kellen, ‘Ideology and rebellion: terrorism in West Germany’, in Walter Reich and Walter Laqueur, 
eds, Origins of terrorism: psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind, new edn (Washington DC, Baltimore and 
London: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), pp. 43–59, at p. 47.
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racism is vitally important.15 This piece, however, is focused on EDL activists, 
following the methods of other authors investigating the far and radical right,16 and 
indeed moving away from the criminological norm of attempting to understand 
racial or religious hate crime through a ‘victimological perspective’, rather than 
engaging with the processes through which hate or racism is engendered.17
My own position clearly features in this reflexive research, although there is not 
the space here for a comprehensive account. The fact that I am a white middle-
class woman academic who used to work for the BBC and who, for instance, 
voted Remain in the Brexit referendum, was a source first of suspicion, mistrust or 
abuse, and then—for those who engaged—of light-hearted mockery. I challenged 
participants on their views and they challenged me on mine. Following Nayak,18 
I aimed to go beyond the ‘tropes of masculinity’ associated with these working-
class actors. So, as Zalewski entreats us to question the unquestionable,19 here I 
seek to confront the unconfrontable. I do so for two reasons: in order to further 
existing knowledge at a time of social precariousness, and to ask, using Zalewski’s 
man question as a guide: what work does gender do in structuring anti-Islam(ist) 
masculinities?
Part one: from ‘man’ question to toxic ‘masculinity’: a genealogy
It is more than 20 years since Zalewski and feminist scholars posed the ‘man question’ 
in IR, repositioning the attention from female subjectivities to the problematiza-
tion of men. At the centre of this question was the rendering of women’s visibility 
within politics and IR. The ‘woman’ question had not succeeded in moving 
women from the margins of IR. Now, it was hoped, ‘another approach’ would 
produce a different result. This was not about relegating feminism or women 
within gendered methodologies; the man question was squarely targeted at desta-
bilizing IR as a masculinist field, asserting the significance of gendered relations, 
of gender as power. The question drew attention to patriarchy and to gendered 
practices; it emphasized structural inequalities, but also women’s subjectivities. In 
essence, it considered questions of agency and identity as enmeshed in those of 
structure, and it constituted a means of challenging the inertia of a field which 
15 See e.g. the work of the TellMAMA Team, ‘TellMAMA: about us’, 2018, https://tellmamauk.org/about-us/.
16 See e.g. Pilkington, Loud and proud; Pete Simi, ‘Why study white supremacist terror? A research note’, Deviant 
Behavior 31: 3, 2010, pp. 251–73; Mark Hamm, ‘Apocalyptic violence: the seduction of terrorist subcultures’, 
Theoretical Criminology 8: 3, 2004, pp. 323–39; Blee, ‘Ethnographies of the far right’; Michael Kimmel and Abby 
L. Ferber, ‘“White men are this nation”: right-wing militias and the restoration of rural American masculin-
ity’, Rural Sociology 65: 582-604, 2000; Bailey, ‘Extremism, community and stigma’; Joel Busher, The making 
of anti-Muslim protest: grassroots activism in the English Defence League (London and New York: Routledge, 2015). 
My work on Islamist extremism adopts a parallel methodology, focusing on actors rather than victims, and 
engaging with participants’ accounts of their pathways into ‘extreme’ groups through field research.
17 Benjamin Bowling and Coretta Phillips, Racism, crime and justice (Harlow: Pearson, 2002), cited in James 
Treadwell and Jon Garland, ‘Masculinity, marginalization and violence: a case study of the English Defence 
League’, British Journal of Criminology 51: 4, 2011, pp. 621–2.
18 See Anoop Nayak, ‘Displaced masculinities: chavs, youth and class in the post-industrial city’, Sociology 40: 5, 
2006, pp. 813–31.
19 Zalewski, ‘Introduction’, p. 12.
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had failed to see women adequately or engage with the question of gender as a 
core endeavour.20 
The prescience of Zalewski’s man question and the reframing of the gender 
perspective that it embodied soon became apparent. In 2001, the events of 9/11 
catalysed what some insisted was a ‘new age’ of global terrorism.21 Ten years after 
first asking the question, Parpart and Zalewski therefore re-posed the man ques-
tion as imperative to understanding the increased ‘virility’ of the post-9/11 age. Its 
relevance was greater than ever. Masculinities—and, in particular, masculinisms—
still structured IR.22 For Eisenstein, 9/11 and the US response in the ‘war on terror’ 
were evidence of a ‘manly moment’.23 The United States had mobilized gendered 
and racialized narratives instrumentalizing women’s rights to justify military action 
in Afghanistan.24 The evident effects of 9/11 in the international system meant 
that other national counterterrorism responses across the globe replicated these 
gendered logics.25 In the UK, a state counter-extremism programme called the 
‘Prevent’ strategy was launched in 2006–2007 to counter (Islamist) radicalization. 
This reproduced assertions familiar from the ‘war on terror’ of Muslim men as a 
suspect and risky community.26 Brown notes that Prevent’s maternalist engage-
ment of Muslim women as mothers complemented the transactional paternalism 
of state projects aimed at protecting society from Muslim ‘others’. Also, deradi-
calization programming acted to emasculate particular (Muslim) men, and radi-
calization was framed as a relegated and dangerous masculinity.27 Although much 
discussion of masculinity has focused on socio-structural factors and the discursive 
production of masculinities, Amar has observed that racialized discussions of ‘toxic’ 
masculinity linked to (Islamist) extremism have enabled the deliberate neglect of 
the structural conditions producing particular identities and behaviours.28 In their 
re-posing of the man question, Parpart and Zalewski noted that gendered relations 
still structured the global order in ways that enabled both structural and martial 
violence, which they recognized as ‘toxic’.29
Another ten years on, ‘toxicity’ has a fresh resonance for a new age of populism, 
informed by the events of 9/11. A Google search of the terms ‘far right’ and ‘toxic 
20 Zalewski, ‘Introduction’.
21 Bruce Hoffman, Inside terrorism, 2nd rev. edn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Peter Neumann, 
Old and new terrorism (Cambridge, UK, and Malden, MA: Polity, 2009).
22 Kathy E. Ferguson, ‘Interpretation and genealogy in feminism’, Signs 16: 2, 1991, pp. 322–39; Parpart and 
Zalewski, ‘Introduction: rethinking the man question’, p. 2.
23 Zillah Eisenstein, Against empire: feminisms, racism and the West (London: Zed, 2004), p. 161.
24 Jasbir K. Puar and Amit S. Rai, ‘Monster, terrorist, fag: the war on terrorism and the production of docile 
patriots’, Social Text 20: 3, 2002, pp. 117–48; Laura J. Shepherd, ‘Veiled references: constructions of gender 
in the Bush administration discourse on the attacks on Afghanistan post-9/11’, International Feminist Journal of 
Politics 8: 1, 2006, pp. 19–41.
25 Katherine E. Brown, ‘Gender and counter-radicalization: women and emerging counter-terror measures’, in 
Jayne Huckerby and Margaret L. Satterthwaite, eds, Gender, national security and counter-terrorism (Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge, 2013).
26 Naaz Rashid, ‘Giving the silent majority a stronger voice? Initiatives to empower Muslim women as part of 
the UK’s “war on terror”’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 37: 4, 2014, pp. 589–604; Brown, ‘Gender and counter-
radicalization’.
27 Brown, ‘Gender and counter-radicalization’, p. 48.
28 Paul Amar, ‘Middle East masculinity studies: discourses of “men in crisis”, industries of gender in revolution’, 
Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 7: 3, 2011, p. 36.
29 Parpart and Zalewski, ‘Introduction: rethinking the man question’, pp. 3–4.
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masculinity’ apparently yields thousands of results, and headlines such as ‘How 
the far right feeds on male insecurity’. A discourse of toxic masculinity applied 
to Muslim men during the ‘war on terror’ is increasingly used to locate responsi-
bility for Islamophobia-as-extremism with a new ‘subordinate’ man, and is insti-
tuted in policy. A growing literature explores the idea of reciprocity to suggest 
an equivalence in the gender norms and drivers of the two movements, though 
so far there is little evidence for this.30 British politicians and analysts have repeat-
edly linked a ‘crisis of masculinity’ and toxicity to ‘extremist’ violence.31 From 
2011, when Prevent began to engage with the far right, the strategy drew parallels 
between those actively supporting extreme right and Islamist ideologies, through 
an invocation of the hallmarks of subordinate and toxic males, ignoring those 
men not described by this characterization. In both movements, Prevent states, 
actors were ‘usually male, poorly educated (although there are some cases of high-
achieving individuals) and often unemployed’.32 Policy-makers typified extremism 
as a problem of the ‘low-achieving’, effectively discounting explanations of male 
violence that did not feature educational, familial or economic dysfunction. The 
effect is the ‘toxification’ of masculinities in communities understood as ‘extreme’. 
At the same time, policy began to characterize anti-Islam sentiment as 
‘extremism’.33 Yet, Baroness Warsi noted that Islamophobia was becoming 
increasingly accepted in public discourse,34 and distinctions between state security 
policies, Islamophobic discourse and discussion of multiculturalism were blurred. 
Nonetheless, rather than focusing on the ubiquity of societal Islamophobia, or 
its role in paternalist state security policies, the idea of toxicity is employed to 
30 See for instance Julia Ebner, The rage: the vicious circle of Islamist and far-right extremism (London and New York: I. 
B. Tauris, 2017), p. 10, https://www.amazon.co.uk/Rage-Vicious-Islamist-Far-Right-Extremism-ebook/dp/
B0746HD6R6/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1527613467&sr=8-2&keywords=the+rage; Ashley A. Mattheis and 
Charlie Winter, ‘“The greatness of her position”: comparing identitarian and jihadi discourses on women’ 
(International Centre for  the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2019); Matthew Feldman, ‘From 
radical-right Islamophobia to “cumulative extremism”’ (Faith Matters, 2012), http://www.safecampuscom-
munities.ac.uk/uploads/files/2016/08/faith_matters_islamophobia_report_requires_upload.pdf; and Gavin 
Bailey, ‘Widening extremism: definitions in the era of “cumulative extremism”’, (22nd International Confer-
ence of Europeanists, Ces, 2015), https://ces.confex.com/ces/2015/webprogram/Paper9553.html on expand-
ing definitions. 
31 See e.g. Diane Abbott, ‘Britain’s crisis of masculinity’, Demos twentieth birthday lecture (London, 2013); 
David Lammy, ‘Islamists, gangs, the EDL—all target alienated young men’, Guardian, 24 May 2013, http://
www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/24/islamists-gangs-edl-target-young-men; Joan Smith, Home grown: 
how domestic violence turns men into terrorists (London: riverrun, 2019); Joan Smith, ‘How toxic masculinity is 
tied to terrorism’, UnHerd, 16 May 2019, https://unherd.com/2019/05/how-toxic-masculinity-is-tied-to-
terrorism/.
32 Home Office, ‘Prevent strategy’ (Norwich: Home Office, 2011), p. 21, https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf. This is a depiction of 
violence that is not broadly evidenced in the literature.
33 Chris Allen, ‘Why Theresa May is wrong to suggest that Islamophobia is a form of extremism’, HuffPost 
UK, 20 June 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-chris-allen/islamophobia_b_17214242.html; Alan 
Travis, ‘May says Islamophobia is a form of extremism, marking shift in rhetoric’, Guardian, 19 June 2017, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/19/may-says-islamophobia-form-extremism-marking-shift-
rhetoric.
34 David Batty, ‘Lady Warsi claims Islamophobia is now socially acceptable in Britain’, Guardian, 20 Jan. 2011, https://
www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jan/20/lady-warsi-islamophobia-muslims-prejudice; Matthew Weaver, ‘Lady 
Warsi: ministers fuelling Muslim radicalisation’, Guardian, 16 June 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/poli-
tics/2015/jun/16/lady-warsi-ministers-fuelling-muslim-radicalisation; Sayeeda Warsi, The enemy within: a tale of 
Muslim Britain (London: Allen Lane, 2017).
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exceptionalize particular masculinities, not to interrogate broader manifestations 
of Islamophobia or the exclusionary effects of patriarchy per se. 
The pernicious effects of the term ‘toxic masculinity’ can be traced to its genesis 
within the psychological literature on masculinities,35 part of the broader litera-
ture of critical studies on men and masculinities (CSMM). Kupers suggests toxic 
masculinity is ‘the constellation of socially regressive male traits that serve to foster 
domination, the devaluation of women, homophobia, and wanton violence’.36 
This definition is clearly linked to men’s bodies, and is embedded in notions of 
male deviance, violence and marginalization. Toxicity is centrally related to three 
foundational concepts introduced by the influential masculinities scholar Raewyn 
Connell: hegemonic masculinity, itself formulated in relation to two other 
expressions of the masculine, as subordinate and marginalized.37 Authors have 
studied men and masculinity since the 1950s;38 however, it is Connell’s concept of 
hegemonic masculinity that has been most formative in understanding how partic-
ular masculinities dominate, and what masculinity means.39 CSMM has relied on 
Butler’s formulation of gender as performative and socially constructed.40 Connell 
approaches masculinity through a socio-structural lens,41 suggesting it is ‘a place in 
gender relations, the practices through which men and women engage that place 
in gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experiences, personality and 
culture’.42 More recently, the plurality of masculinities has been acknowledged. 
Masculinities are relational, constructed in opposition to femininities, and enacted 
according to a hierarchy, in which certain masculinities are preferable to others.43 
The study of ‘subordinate masculinities’ has often been preoccupied with 
‘problem men’, and has been formative in work on (male) crime and violence.44 
Kimmel, who has written extensively on politically radical masculinities, notes 
that ‘all masculinities are not created equal’.45 Within the extremism discourse, 
‘toxic’ men are often the most marginalized, or subordinate, in terms of class 
35 Syed Haider, ‘The shooting in Orlando, terrorism or toxic masculinity (or both?)’, Men and Masculinities 19: 
5, 2016, pp. 555–65.
36 Terry A. Kupers, ‘Toxic masculinity as a barrier to mental health treatment in prison’, Journal of Clinical Psychol-
ogy 61: 6, 2005, p. 714.
37 R. W. Connell, ‘The social organization of masculinity’, in Stephen M. Whitehead and Frank J. Barrett, eds, 
The masculinities reader (Oxford: Polity, 2001), pp. 38–41; Raewyn W. Connell, Gender and power: society, the 
person and sexual politics (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).
38 Stephen M. Whitehead and Frank J. Barrett, ‘The sociology of masculinity’, in Whitehead and Barrett, eds, 
The masculinities reader, p. 15; Chris Beasley, Gender and sexuality: critical theories, critical thinkers (London and 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005), p. 179.
39 Raewyn W. Connell, Masculinities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Victoria Foster, Michael Kimmel and 
Christine Skelton, ‘What about the boys?’, in Wayne Martino and Bob Meyenn, eds, What about the boys? An 
overview of debates (London: McGraw-Hill Education UK, 2001).
40 Judith Butler, Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity, new edn (New York: Routledge, 
2006); Judith Butler, ‘Your behavior creates your gender’, Big Think, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Bo7o2LYATDc.
41 R. W. Connell, ‘Encounters with structure’, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 17: 1, 2004, 
pp. 10–27.
42 Connell, Masculinities, p. 71.
43 Connell, Gender and power.
44 James W. Messerschmidt, Masculinities and crime: critique and reconceptualization of theory (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 1993).
45 Michael Kimmel, ‘Integrating men into the curriculum’, Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 4: 1, 1997, pp. 
181–96.
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or race, or both.46 However, the discourse has frequently failed to understand 
the complexities of the relationship between subordination, context and power. 
There are four key reasons for this, found in critiques of Connell’s initial concep-
tualization.47 First, initial work on masculinities failed to take adequate account of 
intersectional issues of class, race or identities beyond the global North.48 It also 
occluded differences of sexuality and how these act to produce masculinities and 
femininities.49 Second, among the difficulties Flood identifies in Connell’s use of 
the term masculinity is slippage between ‘cultural/moral leadership’ (a description 
of what constitutes dominant manhood) and ‘empirical reference specifically to 
actual groups of men’.50 The latter observation matters in discussion of ‘subordi-
nate’ masculinity, often associated with groups of particular men. Third, Beasley 
suggests women are too absent from Connell’s accounts of masculinity, which 
fails to recognize women’s roles in either constituting masculinity or embodying 
it.51 
Finally, Connell’s structural approach ‘lets men off the hook’, Beasley suggests, 
by relegating male agency or identity in its account.52 In particular, for Connell, 
widespread violence—such as waves of Islamist resistance—has ‘crisis tenden-
cies’.53 Here there is a risk of eliding the specificities of the local. In fact, a ‘crisis 
of masculinity’ has been repeatedly invoked for more than a hundred years, and 
in a variety of global contexts.54 It is problematic because it universalizes gender 
experiences, portraying men in crisis, Asher suggests, as a ‘homogeneous mass ... 
posited in relation to equally theoretical self-assured females’.55 Yet it is within 
the contemporary ‘crisis’ discourse that toxic masculinity has become a vessel 
for particular forms of crisis, including extremism. There can be no ‘crisis’ of 
masculinity without a norm from which the crisis deviates;56 toxicity has become 
46 Amar, ‘Middle East masculinity studies’.
47 Raewyn W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, ‘Hegemonic masculinity: rethinking the concept’, Gender 
and Society 19: 6, 2005, pp. 829–59; Rachel Jewkes, Robert Morrell, Jeff Hearn, Emma Lundqvist, David 
Blackbeard, Graham Lindegger, Michael Quayle, Yandisa Sikweyiya and Lucas Gottzén, ‘Hegemonic mascu-
linity: combining theory and practice in gender interventions’, Culture, Health and Sexuality 17: sup2, 2015, pp. 
112–27; Christine Beasley, ‘Rethinking hegemonic masculinity in a globalizing world’, Men and Masculinities 
11: 1, 2008, pp. 86–103; Beasley, Gender and sexuality.
48 Jewkes et al., ‘Hegemonic masculinity’.
49 Jack Halberstam, Female masculinity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); Beasley, Gender and sexuality; 
Gayle S. Rubin, ‘Thinking sex: notes for a radical theory of the politics of sexuality’, in Deviations: A Gayle 
Rubin Reader (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).
50 Michael Flood, ‘Between men and masculinity: an assessment of the term “masculinity” in recent scholarship 
on men’ in Sharyn Pearce and Vivienne Muller, eds, Manning the next millennium: studies in masculinities (Perth, 
Australia: Black Swan, 2002), cited in Beasley, ‘Rethinking hegemonic masculinity in a globalizing world’, p. 
88.
51 Beasley, ‘Rethinking hegemonic masculinity in a globalizing world’; Beasley, Gender and sexuality.
52 Beasley, Gender and sexuality, p. 229.
53 Connell, ‘The social organization of masculinity’, p. 45.
54 Judith A. Allen, ‘Men interminably in crisis? Historians on masculinity, sexual boundaries, and manhood’, 
Radical History Review 82: 1, 2002, pp. 191–207; Francis Dupuis-Déri, ‘The bogus “crisis” of masculinity’, The 
Conversation, n.d., http://theconversation.com/the-bogus-crisis-of-masculinity-96558; Rebecca Asher, Man 
up: boys, men and breaking the male rules (New York: Harvill Secker, 2016); John MacInnes, ‘The crisis of mascu-
linity and the politics of identity’, in Whitehead and Barrett, The masculinities reader, pp. 1–29; Whitehead and 
Barrett, ‘The sociology of masculinity’.
55 Asher, Man up, p. 113.
56 Mary Louise Roberts, ‘Beyond “crisis” in understanding gender transformation’, Gender and History 28: 2, 2016, 
pp. 358–66.
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co-opted into extremism discourse as a rhetorical device. CSMM authors have 
linked masculinity in crisis to the macro-effects of globalization, suggesting that 
this is an explanatory factor across a spectrum of extremist ideologies. Authors 
have cited ‘crisis’ alongside ‘protest’ masculinities and emasculation as drivers in 
such groups, a common factor being a reassertion of male power in the face of 
changing gender norms.57 Extremism discourses are constructed on the basis of 
such assertions and this is recognized by some as problematic. In their work on the 
EDL, Treadwell and Garland note that the structural emphasis of Connell’s early 
work fails to engage with men’s subjectivities. They suggest that socio-structural 
approaches risk pathologizing marginalized or subordinate men. Rather than 
relying on toxicity to explain broad structural issues for subordinate men, they 
advocate the approach favoured by Hood-Williams, ‘namely one which considers 
the psychological character of masculinity, in so far as masculinity is a kind of 
identity it must refer us to a study of the interior life of the person’.58 However, 
it is Zalewski’s man question which, with its fundamental and relentless task of 
destabilizing and problematizing patriarchy, offers a path forward in the under-
standing and deconstructing of extremism.
Part two: ‘toxic’ masculinity as the promise of patriarchy: the EDL
The exceptionalism of particular men read as both extreme and toxic, and their 
framing as such in policy initiatives, does nothing to disrupt existing gendered 
relations, as Zalewski and Stern predicted. Rather, this exceptionalism enables 
discourses of ‘masculinity’ framing counter-extremism responses to amplify 
pre-existing power differentials, and shift the focus from patriarchy to the problem 
of particular men.59 As Stern and Zalewski forewarned, ‘Masculinity tends also 
to become a (gender) “thing” which we have learned, understood, imported, 
conveyed, tried to change; more inflections of paradox. “Gender” becomes 
reduced to either “women”, “men”, or “femininity”, “masculinity”; and crucially 
we lose sight of the productive power involved.’60 Current discussion leaves little 
room to see how masculinity is not simply a property of men’s bodies (it is also 
about women), with particular men responsible for extremist masculinities; nor 
does it acknowledge the ways in which toxicity is produced, not in particular men 
57 Michael S. Kimmel, ‘Globalization and its mal(e)contents: the gendered moral and political economy of 
terrorism’, International Sociology 18: 3, Sept. 2003, pp. 603–20; Raewyn W. Connell, ‘Globalisation, impe-
rialism and masculinities’, in Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff R. Hearn and Robert W. Connell, eds, Handbook of 
studies on men and masculinities (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004), pp. 71–89; Raewyn Connell, ‘Masculinity 
research and global society’, in Esther Ngan-Ling Chow, Marcia Texler Segal and Lin Tan, Analyzing gender, 
intersectionality, and multiple inequalities: global, transnational and local contexts, ‘Advances in gender research’, vol. 
15 (Bingley: Emerald Group, 2011), pp. 51–72; Kimmel and Ferber, ‘“White men are this nation”’; Michael 
Kimmel, Healing from hate: how young men get into—and out of—violent extremism (Oakland, CA: University of 
California Press, 2018); Michael Kimmel, Angry white men: American masculinity at the end of an era, rev. edn (New 
York: Bold Type, 2017).
58 Treadwell and Garland, ‘Masculinity, marginalization and violence’, p. 624; John Hood-Williams, ‘Gender, 
masculinities and crime: from structures to psyches’, Theoretical Criminology 5: 37–60, 2001, pp. 39–40.
59 Marysia Zalewski, Feminist International Relations: exquisite corpse (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 
pp. 92–9.
60 Stern and Zalewski, ‘Feminist fatigue(s)’, p. 619.
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because of who and what they are, but through a matrix of gendered relations 
produced in space and productive of that space.
This section draws on interviews carried out with EDL activists between 2016 
and 2018, with the aims of further problematizing the ‘toxicity’ approach and 
outlining two possible paths along which to follow the ‘man’ question in research 
in this field.61 The first is to outline the ways in which EDL masculinities are part 
of wider social norms. The second is to disrupt the necessary link between men’s 
bodies and masculinities, considering women’s presence in the movement. In this 
section I explore the material ways in which race, gender and class intersect in 
local spaces to produce particular masculinities. This exploration suggests that 
the concept of toxic masculinity is inadequate to describe the gender practices 
of those involved in anti-Islam(ist) protest, and I advocate instead a return to the 
fundamentals of Zalewski’s man question to elucidate the complexity of mascu-
linities in this scene. 
Continuities: race, class and local masculinities
The EDL emerged in 2009 in Luton as an explicitly working-class street protest 
movement with a ‘single-issue’ focus: to oppose ‘global Islamification’.62 In partic-
ular, it was a response to poppy-burning protests by the Islamist preacher Anjem 
Choudary and other Al-Muhajiroun activists.63 Some authors regard the EDL 
and other radical right groups with an anti-Islam(ist) agenda as simply fascism 
repackaged.64 Feldman, for example, describes the EDL as ‘old wine in new 
bottles’, the ‘old racism’ of skin colour replaced with the ‘new cultural racism’ of 
faith.65 Gattinara also suggests that assertions of cultural ‘incompatibility’ merely 
represent a narrative turning-point from assertions of racial inferiority.66 Other 
authors suggest that the task of categorizing the EDL is more complex,67 given 
its inclusivity towards women, Jewish people, Sikhs and gay people, all of whom 
are framed as (fellow) ‘marginalized’ groups in need of particular protection from 
Islam.68 The EDL is also increasingly understood as part of a new wave of right-
wing populism in Europe and the Americas focused on anti-immigration policies, 
particularly countering Islam.69 
61 Pseudonyms are used except for leadership figures who consented to being identified.
62 Pilkington, Loud and proud, pp. 37–8.
63 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, A neo-nationalist network—the English Defence League and Europe’s counter-jihad 
movement (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2013).
64 See Donald Holbrook and Max Taylor, ‘Introduction’, in Donald Holbrook, Max Taylor and P. M. Currie, 
eds, Extreme right wing political violence and terrorism (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 2; John 
Meadowcroft and Elizabeth A. Morrow, ‘Violence, self-worth, solidarity and stigma: how a dissident, far-
right group solves the collective action problem’, Political Studies 65: 2, 2017, pp. 373–90.
65 Feldman, From radical-right Islamophobia to ‘cumulative extremism’, pp. 1, 10.
66 Pietro Castelli Gattinara, Research overview of far right narratives (Radicalisation Awareness Network Publication, 
2016), p. 3.
67 See Bartlett and Littler, Inside the EDL; Pilkington, Loud and proud; Busher, The making of anti-Muslim protest.
68 While I saw a small number of activists from ethnic minority groups at protests, I did not succeed in inter-
viewing them.
69 Ulrike M. Vieten and Scott Poynting, ‘Contemporary far-right racist populism in Europe’, Journal of Inter-
cultural Studies 37: 6, 2016, pp. 533–40; Anoosh Chakelian, ‘Populist fascism is coming to the UK: who is 
fighting against it?’, New Statesman, 9 Aug. 2018, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2018/08/popu-
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Women have constituted perhaps 30 per cent of activists.70 Busher, an ethnog-
rapher of the movement, notes that masculinity matters in the EDL, yet can often 
be reduced to pathologizing accounts, depicting men as ‘angry, white, damaged 
and vulnerable ...  seeking to protect their social status and reassert their compro-
mised masculinity’.71 There is a ‘kernel of truth’ to this, he admits. Toxicity as 
a pathologizing account neglects the ways in which care in EDL masculinities 
conforms with feminist scholars’ accounts of the linkages between nationalism, 
patriarchy and citizenship. For EDL activists, as for nationalists, male honour and 
national identity are located in the female body; there is an expectation that—
white working-class—British women will be protected by the British state, as 
a form of covenant. Participants regarded this covenant as eroded. They saw 
themselves as ‘second-class citizens’ within a hierarchy of multiculturalism. In an 
inversion of Coomaraswamy’s suggestion that ‘during war [women’s] purity is 
deliberately assaulted precisely because it strikes at the core of ethnic identity’,72 
participants reproduce cases of the mass sexual exploitation of ‘their’ women in 
‘grooming’ cases as evidence of a culture war against them.73 
EDL masculinities were produced in the intersections of gender with race, 
poverty and class. Research participants described how violence that fell outside 
the accepted norms and racialized expectations of their community—partici-
pants suggested that fights should be ‘fair’, one-on-one for instance—could prove 
productive of new racialized masculinities. A racialized notion of the ‘fair fight’ 
featured in the account by ‘Daniel’ of confrontation with a group of (what he said 
were) Muslim men. ‘Daniel’ described a relationship of spatial proximity with, but 
existential distance from Muslim neighbours. This relationship was characterized 
by the permanent possibility of male violence, a broader feature of his environ-
ment. He is in his twenties, an EDL activist and a veteran of Iraq, but it was in his 
home town, he said, that he experienced his worst injury: 
I was attacked by ten Muslims. [Q: What happened?] They were fiddling with my neigh-
bours’ van and I ...  went out and chased them. They called me a white bastard, and ...  I 
confronted them—I had a pipe in my hand. [Q: A pipe?] I thought I needed a weapon, 
because they all had weapons. They ran into the shop on [X] street, hiding behind the 
counter, calling me a white bastard. They said, ‘It’s our town, we will do what we want.’ 
So, they stabbed me in the back.74
list-fascism-coming-uk-who-fighting-against-it; Bartlett and Littler, Inside the EDL; Busher, The making of 
anti-Muslim protest; Pilkington, Loud and proud.
70 Nigel Copsey, The English Defence League: challenging our country and our values of social inclusion, fairness and equality 
(London: Faith Matters, Nov. 2010), p. 29; Matthew Goodwin, The roots of extremism: the English Defence League 
and the counter-jihad challenge, briefing paper (London: Chatham House, 2013), p. 6, http://www.chatham-
house.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf; Treadwell and Garland, 
‘Masculinity, marginalization and violence’, p. 621; Bartlett and Littler, Inside the EDL, p. 14; Pilkington, 
‘“EDL angels stand beside their men ...  not behind them”’; Elizabeth Pearson, To what extent does gender matter 
in extremism in the UK?, PhD thesis (King’s College London, 2018).
71 Busher, The making of anti-Muslim protest, paras 51–2.
72 Radhika Coomaraswamy, ‘A question of honour: women, ethnicity and armed conflict’, Third Minority 
Rights Lecture, Geneva, 1999, http://www.sacw.net/Wmov/RCoomaraswamyOnHonour.html.
73 But only those cases involving men framed as Muslim.
74 Author’s interview with ‘Daniel’, 25 Aug. 2016.
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‘Daniel’ told me only one of his attackers was arrested and jailed. For ‘Daniel’, 
this experience had a number of consequences: it destroyed his trust in state insti-
tutions to protect him, and reconfigured his relationship with the state (for which 
he had worked on active military service); it prompted him to attend EDL demon-
strations; it constituted a new racialized identity through an insulting label (‘white 
bastard’). This confrontation with his race as ‘other’ was significant for ‘Daniel’ 
to his masculine identity. As Boesten notes, ‘Gender ...  and sexuality ...  help 
define and naturalize the hierarchies based on race and class.’75 Expectations of 
privilege are central to white identity. For Frankenberg, ‘white people and people 
of color live racially structured lives ...  White people are “raced”, just as men are 
“gendered”.’76 James suggests that while ethnic minority identities are frequently 
constructed around shared practices and experiences, positive representations of 
a shared culture, as well as disadvantage, white identity is ‘grounded in a sense 
of entitlement and victimhood relative to people of color’.77 Gear Rich suggests 
that many white people experience racial identity as part of their everyday lived 
experience.78 Indeed, a key theme in the narratives of white participants in this 
research is that they are specifically marginalized as the ‘white working class’. They 
argue, in effect, that their race is visible to them as something to be overcome, 
but is invisible to privileged whites. These participants constitute what James 
names the ‘marginal whites’, who do not experience ‘full’ white privilege, owing 
to their class or immigrant heritage.79 For ‘Daniel’, the confrontation described 
above produced a racialized and violent masculinity as—for him—an appropriate 
response to what he perceived as the injustice of Muslim violence in his area, and 
the institutional failure to address this. ‘Daniel’ now regards retaliatory violence 
as one necessary aspect of competition for ‘ownership’ of the town that he feels 
should uncontestably be his. In order to defend it, he suffered an injury that he 
suggested was worse than anything he encountered in Iraq. His ‘own community’ 
is experienced as a war zone, a site of conflict and contested identity.
‘Daniel’ also used wider discourses on race, Islam and multiculturalism to frame 
his perception of a hierarchy of race, in which he believed he was a second-class 
citizen. The discourse of the death of multiculturalism mattered to participants. 
They echoed a sentiment expressed by then-Prime Minister David Cameron, 
in a 2011 Munich conference speech, namely that multiculturalism had been 
responsible for a loss of British values and the emergence of (Islamist) radical-
ization.80 This shared nationalism meant research participants deeply resented 
75 Jelke Boesten, Sexual violence during war and peace: gender, power, and post-conflict justice in Peru (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 4.
76 Ruth Frankenberg, White women, race matters: the social construction of whiteness, new edn (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 1.
77 Osamudia R. James, ‘White like me: the negative impact of the diversity rationale on white identity forma-
tion’, New York University Law Review 89: 2, 2014, pp. 425–6.
78 Camille Gear Rich, ‘Marginal whiteness’, California Law Review, no. 1498, 2010, pp. 1497–594.
79 In fact, half of the participants are Irish, or describe themselves as of Irish heritage, a finding also noted by 
Busher in his 2015 study of the EDL, The making of anti-Muslim protest, para 362.
80 David Cameron, ‘PM’s speech at Munich Security Conference’, 5 Feb. 2011, http://webarchive.national-
archives.gov.uk/20130109092234/http://number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-confer-
ence/.
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state suggestions that the EDL was ‘extremist’ in the same way as groups such 
as Al-Muhajiroun, who support the introduction of shari’a law into the UK. 
Hewitt has written of the ‘white backlash’ to British multiculturalism as a ‘socially 
disparate set of responses to equalities discourses’.81 EDL supporters I talked to 
endorsed the ‘British values’ originally articulated by Cameron (patriotism, the 
Union flag). Yet they perceived the state to have supported long-term change that 
had destroyed their communities, and supported a Muslim ‘other’ they regard as 
a gendered threat. Participants, for instance, frequently mobilized around issues 
such as the sexual exploitation of English women by Muslim men, terror attacks, 
female genital mutilation—but only in Muslim communities—or opposition to 
the niqab and burka. They resented what they regarded as censorship on these 
issues, citing the lack of censorship for others they admire for their outspoken and 
often racist views on Islam, including politicians and celebrities such as Donald 
Trump, Boris Johnson or Katie Hopkins. Participants perceived a double standard 
under which censorship was applied to them for reasons of class, not opinion.
EDL masculinities were therefore not isolated. In particular, aggressive hyper-
masculinities were produced in space as part of a particular repertoire of behav-
iours, both continuous and contiguous with a broader community. ‘Darren’, a 
long-term activist with both EDL and the Infidels,82 now in his forties, told me:
When you’re growing up ...  you walk over them, before they walk over you. You become 
a face—a face who is known on the street, or you become a target. You have to become 
someone that people think, don’t fuck with him, that’s Darren ...  Then that reputation 
spreads and keeps you out of trouble for life.83
When I asked other men about their life growing up before the EDL, they too 
described a constant potential for violence and the need to avoid victimization. 
Size was an indicator of strength, with perceived hyper-masculinity fixed in physi-
cality and bodily presence.84 Tommy Robinson, whose birth name is Stephen 
Yaxley-Lennon, is one of the EDL’s founders. He is a particularly divisive figure, 
banned from social media in 2019 for breaching hate-speech rules and, at the time 
of writing, in jail for contempt of court.85 Robinson told me it was important to 
project size to avoid confrontation, never walking with the gaze cast down, or 
slouching, for instance. Any inability to avoid victimization entailed emascula-
tion. 
Hyper-masculinity was, however, only one of a range of masculinities for 
men in the EDL, and being an activist involved multiple masculine performances, 
81 Roger Hewitt, White backlash and the politics of multiculturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
p. 4.
82 A violent offshoot of the EDL often expressing racist ideology.
83 Author’s interview with ‘Darren’, 4 Aug. 2016.
84 Ramón Spaaij, ‘Men like us, boys like them’, Journal of Sport and Social Issues 32: 4, 1 Nov. 2008, p. 380; J. 
W. Messerschmidt, ‘Becoming “real men”: adolescent masculinity challenges and sexual violence’, Men and 
Masculinities 2: 3, 2000, pp. 286–307.
85 Rory Cellan-Jones, ‘Tommy Robinson banned from Twitter’, BBC News, 28 March 2018, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/technology-43572168; Alex Hern and Jim Waterson, ‘Tommy Robinson banned from Facebook 
and Instagram’, Guardian, 26 Feb. 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/feb/26/tommy-robin-
son-banned-from-facebook-and-instagram.
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some in contrast with the discourse of toxic masculinities as fostering domina-
tion, devaluing women and expressing homophobia outlined by Kupers.86 Male 
participants also emphasized the ways in which they believed their activism repre-
sented a social good, helping the (non-Muslim) homeless, or raising money for 
veterans or for (non-Muslim) victims of sexual exploitation. While the perhaps 
disenfranchised section of the white working class attending demonstrations is 
part of a demographic recently termed the ‘left behind’,87 the caring masculinities 
they expressed were again enabled through the reproduction of broader social 
norms. EDL demonstration culture and practice consciously reproduces behav-
iours common to the homosociality of the football stand, for instance chanting, 
singing and flag-waving, which enable group bonding.88 Participants discussed 
the shared ‘buzz’ this created.89 While Dunning suggests football culture tends 
to ‘stress ability to fight, “hardness” and ability to “hold one’s ale” as marks of 
being a “man”’,90 this is not just about toxic or hyper-masculinities. The football 
stand is an important affective resource as one of the few spaces in which men can 
actively show emotions including love, sadness, anger, grief and care, and the EDL 
consciously reproduced this.91 
These insights from the field are indicative of a particularly masculinized white 
working-class tradition, which participants believe was under threat from liberal 
elites, ‘Islam’ and the state. Yet participants also drew on state norms about the 
pernicious effects of multiculturalism, tied to the risk of Islam(ist) violence and 
toxic Muslim masculinities, to frame their perceptions. 
Women, masculinities and EDL patriarchy
While men active in the EDL express and claim both apparently feminine 
‘caring’ masculinities and more aggressive forms of activism, women’s activism 
disrupts both assumptions of the applicability of ‘toxic masculinity’ to the EDL, 
and, following Zalewski, can be understood to disrupt norms of patriarchy and 
manhood within the EDL. Women also adopted masculine roles and practices.92 
As Pilkington notes, men’s numerical dominance at events does not mean that the 
EDL does not appeal to women; nor does it necessarily equate to a lack of space 
in the movement for them.93 If the EDL is a mainly male expression of grievance 
through toxic masculinity, how can one account for the presence of women at 
their demonstrations in any way? Connell herself suggests that ‘focusing only on 
the activities of men occludes the practices of women in the construction of gender 
86 Kupers, ‘Toxic masculinity as a barrier to mental health treatment in prison’.
87 Treadwell and Garland, ‘Masculinity, marginalization and violence’; David Goodhart, The road to somewhere: 
the populist revolt and the future of politics (London: Hurst, 2017), p.19.
88 Pilkington, Loud and proud.
89 A term also familiar from Pilkington.
90 Eric Dunning, ‘Towards a sociological understanding of football hooliganism as a world phenomenon’, Euro-
pean Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 8: 2, 2000, p. 151.
91 Chris Walton, Adrian Coyle and Evanthia Lyons, ‘Death and football: an analysis of men’s talk about 
emotions’, British Journal of Social Psychology 43: 3, 2004, pp. 406, 412.
92 Halberstam, Female masculinity.
93 Pilkington, ‘“EDL angels stand beside their men ...  not behind them”’, pp. 243, 253.
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among men’.94 Research on masculinities and violent groups in other contexts has 
also demonstrated their possibilities for forms of female status gain and emancipa-
tion, although patriarchy is often quickly reconstituted post-conflict.95 
In my research, women, like men, described how they evolved a confron-
tational, sometimes aggressive physicality during their formative years and in 
response to the masculinism of their social environment. Tommy Robinson’s 
former personal assistant Hel Gower, for instance, told me she is a controversial 
figure in the movement, widely known as blunt and confrontational, an approach 
she suggested was shaped by the ‘rough and ready’ East End where she grew up. 
She, like ‘Darren’ (cited above), mythologized a working-class past, its values 
and physical terrain. ‘Georgey’, a seasoned EDL activist in her thirties, sought 
out confrontation with others both online and off, even once challenging the 
Al-Muhajiroun leader Anjem Choudary while he was preaching in the street. She 
saw this encounter as an emasculation of Choudary, based on her assumption that 
it is especially humiliating for Muslim men to be publicly confronted by women. 
Handrahan suggests that women’s peace movements draw on ‘shared experi-
ences that women have as women, mothers and wives subjected to violence’ and 
perhaps therefore reduce the ‘significance of ethnicity’ through strengthened 
gender identity.96 The women here do the opposite; their active appropriation of 
masculine norms, constructed through particular forms of race and class, draws 
further boundaries of faith, class and ethnicity between women. For instance, 
women’s masculine performances were aimed at liberal elites. ‘Georgey’, who is 
in her thirties and works in child care, sees two tiers of feminists. She opposed 
the liberal feminism of women she suggested were ‘stupid cows ...  more worried 
about tits in a tabloid than girls getting their clits cut off ’ to those like herself 
who reject the title ‘feminist’ entirely, yet mobilize on protecting women from 
the perceived abuses of Islam. Both male and female EDL participants believed a 
liberal feminism had failed to defend women from Muslim men, and prioritized 
Islam (read as monolithic and sexually regressive) above the rights of the working 
class (read as sexually progressive). Participants homogenized what was under-
stood by both ‘Islam’ and ‘working class’, ignoring aspects of each that challenged 
their activism.
If the term toxic masculinity does not enable us to see women’s activism in 
the EDL, it also blinds us to EDL misogyny and how EDL patriarchy functions in 
ways consistent with wider society. Female participation in any masculine power 
structure represents a form of transgression.97 In the EDL the male–female gender 
divide was accompanied by an additional binary which categorized women in 
classed language, despite their sharing class identities. Misogyny can emotion-
94 Connell and Messerschmidt, ‘Hegemonic masculinity’, p. 848.
95 Luisa Maria Dietrich Ortega, ‘Looking beyond violent militarized masculinities’, International Feminist Journal 
of Politics 14: 4, 2012, pp. 489–507; Miranda Alison, ‘Women as agents of political violence: gendering security’, 
Security Dialogue 35: 4, 2004, pp. 447–63.
96 Lori Handrahan, ‘Conflict, gender, ethnicity and post-conflict reconstruction’, Security Dialogue 35: 4, 2004, p. 
439.
97 Véronique Pin-Fat and Maria Stern, ‘The scripting of Private Jessica Lynch’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 
30: 1, 2005, pp. 25–53.
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ally mediate social class,98 particularly disgust for working-class women.99 Skeggs 
notes that this demographic, ‘the excessive, unhealthy, publicly immoral white 
working-class woman ...  epitomizes the zeitgeist of the moment’, an obsession 
with denigrating the working class.100 Mainstream depictions of the working class 
are replete with classed abuse: ‘chav’ women are over-sexed and over-fertile;101 
‘underclass’ women’s sexual behaviour is juxtaposed with middle-class sexual 
norms.102 The EDL, as a patriarchal movement sharing norms with wider society, 
enables this classed misogyny to be reproduced within the very communities that 
are often the object of it. 
Masculine performances for women within this homosocial and patriarchal 
space are therefore not risk-free, particularly when women express an indepen-
dent sexuality and, essentially, contest EDL patriarchy.103 Women can encounter 
censure for adopting the various masculinities enabling their participation at 
protest. In the early days of the EDL, male leaders wanted to exclude women. 
Robinson remembered: ‘When we were first going to Bradford ...  for us, the 
men, we were thinking—this is the battleground, like. We’re going to come under 
huge attack. So, we tried saying women weren’t allowed to go [laughs]—fucking 
hell, they went nuts, man.’104 Women did succeed in attending demonstrations, 
despite some EDL leadership opposition, and protested against the then Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s labelling of the EDL as ‘sick’.105 Although men were 
not wanted, they marched behind the women, apparently in order to protect 
them. Hel Gower suggested this act was representative of a misogyny within 
the movement as a whole. The masculine norms of the group, while claiming 
to protect and serve women, in fact relegated female agency as a form of what 
Scrinzi labels ‘gender antagonism’.106 This describes how the broad domination of 
masculine cultures necessitates the marginalization of women, who must struggle 
to find their place within systems that do not favour their participation, except in 
symbolic ways. The consequence is the division of a movement on gender lines. 
Participants who had attended EDL demonstrations for some years distinguished 
between types of women, as well as between men and women. They referenced 
‘coupling up’ as a feature of protest away-days, describing its effects within the 
group. Both male and female participants applied the movement’s highly mascu-
linized group norms to the sexual activity of the women in the movement. Many 
understood female bodies at events in binary terms: those who were honourable 
98 William Ian Miller, The anatomy of disgust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. xiv.
99 Stephanie Lawler, ‘Disgusted subjects: the making of middle-class identities’, Sociological Review 53: 3, 2005, p. 
435.
100 Skeggs, ‘The making of class and gender’, pp. 966–8.
101 Imogen Tyler, ‘“Chav mum chav scum”’, Feminist Media Studies 8: 1, 2008, pp. 29–30.
102 Helen Wilson and Annette Huntington, ‘Deviant (m)others: the construction of teenage motherhood in 
contemporary discourse’, Journal of Social Policy 35: 1, 2006, p. 69.
103 Pilkington, ‘“EDL angels stand beside their men ...  not behind them”’, p. 253.
104 Author’s interview with Tommy Robinson, 26 Sept. 2016.
105 Marshall Peter, ‘EDL women tell Cameron we’re not sick’, Demotix, 8 Oct. 2011, https://web.archive.org/
web/20111011144736/http://www.demotix.com/news/863998/edl-women-tell-cameron-were-not-sick.
106 Francesca Scrinzi, Caring for the nation: men and women activists in radical right populist parties, final research report 
(Brussels: European Research Council, 2014), p. 3.
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and those who were not. The EDL Angels were a sub-group Gower was initially 
involved in organizing, in order to give women a voice to campaign on issues 
important to them, such as child sex exploitation and grooming. Gower shared 
the view of others in the EDL on the Angels, who used classed language: ‘Rough 
as fucking shit, is what most people described them as.’107 Similar gendered and 
classed judgements regarding sexuality were expressed by both men and women 
participants who had regularly attended EDL demonstrations:
To me the Angels seem to be there just to find a man ...  I don’t know why they think 
they have to do it, I really don’t ...  it’s—going through them, it is literally going through 
them. [‘Jane’, 50s]108
People was there just to sleep with anyone ...  some of them [Angels] had a bad reputation 
...  some of the broads were just out for the dick. Some was old. You wouldn’t actually 
believe it. There was one woman, she was 50 years old and she ...  done a good 70%. 
Easy! She was disgusting. [Q: Do you think the guys were equally disgusting?] They was 
disgusting. Just for the demos. Just for sex in hotels, things like that. [‘Iain’, 19]109
Female by birth, but you wouldn’t say they were ladies, put it that way ...  They call 
themselves EDL Angels ...  They’re like Anchor butter, they spread their legs like slappers. 
The men go through them. I wouldn’t. I despise them all, they are filth-bags. [‘Darren’, 
40s]110
Women are active participants in the EDL and, as noted above, frequently ‘do’ 
the same masculinities as the men. However, both male and female participants 
judged and censured particular EDL women, according to a classed misogyny 
apparent in mainstream discourse. This involved a certain hypocrisy. A conversa-
tion with 19-year-old ‘Iain’ was symptomatic. He told me: ‘A woman should stay 
at home and cook and clean, that’s the way I’ve been brought up. The man should 
work.’ I suggested he criticized Islam because he believed it advocated precisely 
this approach to men and women, to which he replied: ‘[But] I would not make 
a woman stand in the kitchen and cook. You wouldn’t make them. A Muslim 
would make them.’111 Participants criticized a (monolithic) Islam for a tradition-
alist approach to gender; yet they also expressed a belief in the importance of 
‘traditional’ gender roles as a legacy of ‘English’ culture. This was one of the 
inconsistencies in their gendered ‘ideology’.
These complexities of masculinity, who can embody masculinities and the risks 
of this embodiment, are occluded by CVE repertoires and media discourses that can 
only associate masculinity in extremist movements with ‘toxic’ men. Returning to 
the Telford demonstration with which I began this article, the then EDL spokesman 
Crossland can be seen to invoke the right to self-expression in terms familiar to 
a marginalized male working-class demographic, and consistent with the culture 
107 Scrinzi, Caring for the nation, p. 3.
108 Author’s interview with ‘Jane’, 1 Sept. 2016.
109 Author’s interview with ‘Iain’, 10 Dec. 2016.
110 Author’s interview with ‘Darren’, 4 Aug. 2016.
111 Author’s interview with ‘Iain’, 10 Dec. 2016.
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and behaviour of his particular community. He demands the right to have the 
men’s masculinity, their flag-waving and offensive chants, their activism against 
Islam(ism), understood as political expression, however stigmatized, and therefore 
not to be dismissed in terms which depoliticize particular men, such as ‘toxic 
masculinity’.112 This is not to imply that working-class culture is homogeneous. 
Clearly, many white working-class people strongly oppose the views of the EDL. 
Nor is it to judge such demonstration as reasonable; it is, rather, to contextualize 
it. What is clear is that EDL protest uses and activates masculinities already familiar 
to protesters from a wider context; activism mobilizes not just hyper-masculinity 
but other more caring masculinities that cannot easily be read as ‘toxic’. Further-
more, there is continuity between EDL masculine identities and wider—patriar-
chal—norms dating from well before the emergence of the counter-jihad scene. 
The EDL is a microcosm of sections of wider British society.
Conclusion 
Narratives of toxicity which readily fit into pre-existing hierarchies of both class 
and race occlude both the range of masculine performances in the EDL and their 
continuities with wider patriarchy. Indeed, not just masculinity in an extreme 
group such as the EDL, but also ‘traditional’ white working-class masculinity is 
often talked of as ‘toxic’ or ‘in crisis’ or ‘subordinate’.113 To those who are not 
working class, working-class culture is often regarded as ‘a hurdle that needs to be 
overcome’.114 From the inside, however, aggressive masculine behaviours, rituals 
and practices that appear threatening to—or indeed threaten—others feel positive. 
I began this piece with a question: what expression of masculinity did I witness at 
the anti-Islam(ist) demonstration by the EDL? If the answer is ‘toxicity’, where is 
the boundary between those aspects of masculine performance that are designated 
toxic, and those that constitute patriarchy, society-wide? 
The piece has explored the relevance of Zalewski’s man question as a route 
into this conundrum, and into an analysis of the ways in which masculinities, 
patriarchy, race and class entwine in producing power and casual violence; and 
to a discussion of masculinity that need not equate manhood itself with threat or 
toxicity. It has focused on a particular radical right movement, the EDL, to show 
how masculinities are revealed, and the material conditions in which they come 
into being, revealing the inadequacy of the toxic masculinity label to describe 
this activism. It has suggested that Zalewski offers a path not just for theoreti-
cians of IR, but for researchers and policy-makers, for whom she provides the 
stepping stones required to circumvent the pitfalls of binary gendered thinking. In 
particular, her work cautions that while masculinity is attached to the bodies and 
112 Sara Ahmed, The cultural politics of emotion, 2nd rev. edn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), pp. 
176–7.
113 Linda McDowell, Redundant masculinities? Employment change and white working class youth (New York and Chich-
ester: Wiley, 2011); Kimmel, ‘Globalization and its mal(e)contents’.
114 Nicola Ingram, ‘Working-class boys, educational success and the misrecognition of working-class culture’, 
British Journal of Sociology of Education 30: 4, 2009, p. 423.
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practices of men, it is not something that exclusively belongs to men.115 It is possible 
to see masculinities in the practices of women; and it is possible to recognize that 
many of the so-called toxic practices of the extreme fringes are present in society 
more widely. Just as extremists are in reality not separate from society,116 toxic 
masculinity is not separate from patriarchy or social gender norms.117 Nor is it an 
adequate term to describe what may not always be ideological, but is certainly 
political, action from ‘underclass’ men, given its delegitimizing effects. However, 
when particular men are regarded as the problem, the issue becomes not one of 
patriarchy, or society, but of agency in specific groups, and the responsibility for 
‘fixing’ patriarchy is pushed onto them.
In the introduction to her 1998 book The ‘man’ question in International Relations, 
Zalewski explained why it was necessary to ask this question to ensure that 
men engaged with their own male power, and why men’s hegemony should 
be problematized.118 There was little optimism in Zalewski’s shift in the focus 
of feminist study from women to men. Twenty years on, the lack of optimism 
seems warranted. The contemporary focus is on particular masculinities. Instead 
of seeing women as ‘a problem to be solved’, the question is now not of ‘man’, 
but of particular categories of men.119 Governments have focused on extremism, 
first violent Islamism and now the radical right, and in so doing have produced as 
embodying ‘risk’ particular racialized and marginalized men, framed through the 
prism of ‘toxicity’. The onus is not on men to question their power, but on partic-
ular men to question their problematic use of violence. Extremism is constructed 
as discourse, divorced from wider society through a move to associate particular 
men with uniquely ‘toxic’ behaviours. Masculinity (singular) is not explored as 
a feature of gendered relations but essentialized in sex. The relational property 
of masculinity is mobilized, not to further understanding of extremist violence, 
but to differentiate good from bad men; to rely on particular men to mitigate 
the failures and violences of patriarchy as a whole. As Zalewski and others have 
emphasized, patriarchal power is resilient, and its intransigence is evident in 
counter-extremism policy and the discourses enabling its enactment.120 
In the UK and beyond, the interest of counter-extremism policy-makers in a 
gendered approach offers possibilities, but at the same time acts to reduce them. 
Contemporary interest in masculinity as a factor in extremism and right-wing 
populism is important; but at the moment, the effects of broader discourse and of 
policy do little more than reify both essentialized approaches to masculinity and 
existing power imbalances between men. For those of us working in contempo-
115 Zalewski, Feminist International Relations, p. 84.
116 Gavin Bailey and Phil Edwards, ‘Rethinking “radicalisation”: microradicalisations and reciprocal radicalisa-
tion as an intertwined process’, Journal for Deradicalization, no. 10, 2017, pp. 255–81.
117 Terry A. Kupers, ‘Psychotherapy with men in prison’, in Gary R. Brooks and Glenn E. Good, eds, A new 
handbook of counseling and psychotherapy approaches for men (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001), cited in Kupers, 
‘Toxic masculinity as a barrier to mental health treatment in prison’, p. 716.
118 Zalewski, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1–12.
119 Zalewski, ‘Introduction’.
120 Paul Kirby and Marsha Henry, ‘Rethinking masculinity and practices of violence in conflict settings’, Inter-
national Feminist Journal of Politics 14: 4, 2012, pp. 445–49; Stern and Zalewski, ‘Feminist fatigue(s)’.
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rary applications of feminist IR, Zalewski has been a canary in the mineshaft. 
She and Stern foresaw these issues, and warned of them. Zalewski’s theorizing 
applied to the ‘extreme’ context destabilizes not just what manhood means, but 
any discourse of extremism constructed on the concept of toxic masculinity. Her 
work on the nature of gender, power and masculinity never loses sight of the 
relations between men and women. It shows the way and warns of the pitfalls 
of approaches that overemphasize questions of masculinities at the expense of 
seeing the power relations consequent on male hegemony and patriarchy. It is 
on these we should focus to understand violence, conflict and the production of 
extremism.
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